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RE: Package review status


On Wed, 2002-09-25 at 21:11, Chris January wrote:
> > >>>*Updated* packages are trusted by default.  They can be uploaded w/o
> > >>>review.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >Not being funny, but this probably shouldn't be the case. I could easily
> > >spoof some mail headers and get a compromised binary uploaded.
> > >
> > Then I suggest you (and other that find in this a security problem) to
> > comment my latest RFC (23/09 13:54 CEST) which tried to resurrect the
> > old thread about using GPG for developers ;-)
> There is also the problem that original binaries form new contributors may
> be compromised. They might sign their e-mail with their GPG key and have it
> trusted by someone else, but what if I've engineered a binary to go off a
> month after my post to do something nasty?

Then we know who did it. :].

Thats all we can ask for anyway, unless we want an auto-build system,
and then who validates that? See the classic 'reflections on trust'
paper/speech anyway. This is a *hard* problem to solve 'completely'.
What parts are important to us, and why?

IMO: 
* official packages are not supplanted by 3rd party sites with bad
versions (for example, binutils from kde-cygwin should not overwrite
binutils from cygwin without telling the user).
* Corrina, Chris and I should be confident that what someone emails to
the list as a ready-to-upload package is indeed from the maintainer.

Thats about it.

Rob

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