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Re: [PATCH] Allow %n in -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 linux programs if /procis not mounted

From: Ulrich Drepper <drepper at redhat dot com>
To: Jakub Jelinek <jakub at redhat dot com>
Cc: Glibc hackers <libc-hacker at sources dot redhat dot com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 03:21:45 -0700
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Allow %n in -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 linux programs if /procis not mounted
Organization: Red Hat, Inc.
References: <20041020100411.GG30497@sunsite.ms.mff.cuni.cz>

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Jakub Jelinek wrote:
> If /proc is not mounted, it is IMHO better to be less protected than
> fail on legitimate %n uses.

I'm not sure this is such a good idea.  This can potentially affect only
a handful of programs, those running before /proc is mounted and those
used fater it is unmounted.  If insight into t hose programs is hard
enough we should use your patch.

I worry about an exploit where a process running as root first run
umount for /proc to disable this and maybe other checks.

- --
â Ulrich Drepper â Red Hat, Inc. â 444 Castro St â Mountain View, CA â
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References:
- [PATCH] Allow %n in -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 linux programs if /proc is not mounted
  - From: Jakub Jelinek

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